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When people see a snake, they are likely to activate both affective information (e.g., danger-
ous) and non-affective information about its ontological category (e.g., animal). According
to the Affective Primacy Hypothesis, the affective information has priority, and its activation
can precede identification of the ontological category of a stimulus. Alternatively, accord-
ing to the Cognitive Primacy Hypothesis, perceivers must know what they are looking at
before they can make an affective judgment about it. We propose that neither hypoth-
esis holds at all times. Here we show that the relative speed with which affective and
non-affective information gets activated by pictures and words depends upon the contexts
in which stimuli are processed. Results illustrate that the question of whether affective
information has processing priority over ontological information (or vice versa) is ill-posed.
Rather than seeking to resolve the debate over Cognitive vs. Affective Primacy in favor of
one hypothesis or the other, a more productive goal may be to determine the factors that
cause affective information to have processing priority in some circumstances and onto-
logical information in others. Our findings support a view of the mind according to which
words and pictures activate different neurocognitive representations every time they are
processed, the specifics of which are co-determined by the stimuli themselves and the
contexts in which they occur.
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INTRODUCTION
If a person is hiking in a jungle and encounters an unknown
creature, affective information associated with the creature might
demand immediate evaluation (e.g., is it safe or dangerous?). If
a person is taking a biology exam, however, and has to classify
animals according to their ontological categories, they might not
even notice how dangerous some animals can be. For decades,
researchers have debated whether affective or non-affective“cogni-
tive” information gets activated first (Storbeck and Clore, 2007, for
review). According to the Affective Primacy Hypothesis (Zajonc,
1980, 2000; LeDoux, 1996), information relevant for affective
responses can be activated quickly and automatically, before infor-
mation about ontological kinds. By contrast, according to the
Cognitive Primacy Hypothesis (Lazarus, 1984; Storbeck et al.,
2006) perceivers must determine the ontological category of a
stimulus before they can evaluate its affective content.
The present study investigates whether one kind of informa-
tion is always activated faster than the other, or whether the speed
with which affective and non-affective information gets activated
varies with context. We propose that neither Affective Primacy nor
Cognitive Primacy should hold at all times. The stimuli themselves
should not fully determine the relative primacy with which affec-
tive and cognitive/non-affective information gets activated, nor
should the judgments that people make on the stimuli. Rather, the
relative speed with which affective and non-affective information
gets activated should depend on the context in which stimuli are
processed, even when the stimuli themselves and the judgments
people make on them are held constant.
Numerous studies have been interpreted as support for either
Affective Primacy or Cognitive Primacy. However, the majority of
these studies only demonstrate processing of one kind of infor-
mation or the other. That is, they either demonstrate how rapidly
affective information can be activated (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993;
LeDoux, 1996) or how rapidly non-affective information can be
activated (Clore and Storbeck, 2006; see also Whalen et al., 1998;
Sereno et al., 2003; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006; Kissler et al., 2007;
Schupp et al., 2007). But these studies do not directly compare the
time courses of affective and non-affective processing for the same
stimuli, and therefore do not bear directly on the question of which
kind of information has processing priority (cf., Weaver et al.,
2010). Likewise, a growing number of studies have explored inter-
actions of affective and non-affective cognitive processing (Gray,
2004; Eastwood and Smilek, 2005; Frischen et al., 2008; Pessoa,
2009; Huang et al., 2011), but they do not bear directly on the
question of interest here concerning the relative speed with which
affective and non-affective aspects of stimuli can be processed. Sev-
eral studies have directly compared effects of affective priming and
non-affective “semantic” priming (e.g., Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc,
1980; Klauer and Musch, 2002; Storbeck and Robinson, 2004).
These studies are informative about the relative strength of affec-
tive and non-affective priming, but are not informative about the
relative speed with which affective vs. non-affective information
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can be activated when stimuli are processed, which is the question
at issue in the debate over Affective vs. Cognitive Primacy.
In one notable exception, Nummenmaa et al. (2010)conducted
a series of experiments designed to directly compare the speed of
affective and non-affective judgments for complex scenes. Their
results appear robust: across six experiments, non-affective judg-
ments about the ontological category of stimuli were faster than
affective judgments about the pleasantness of the stimuli. The
authors concluded that, at least when people are processing novel
visual scenes, “semantic recognition” of the ontological category
of the depicted objects “must precede affective evaluation of the
scene contents” (p. 242, italics added).
We believe this conclusion is not likely to generalize. The debate
over Cognitive Primacy vs. Affective Primacy presupposes that
one kind of processing will always (or generally) be faster than
the other – at least for certain classes of stimuli, such as complex
scenes. Yet, whether affective information gets activated faster or
slower than ontological information will surely depend on (1) the
particulars of the stimuli and (2) the judgments that people make,
and should also depend on (3) the context in which the stimuli are
encountered and the judgments are made.
Proposals 1 and 2 can be confirmed in a thought experiment.
Even within a given stimulus type such as complex scenes, the rel-
ative speed with which people can make affective and ontological
judgments should be easy to manipulate. For example, if people
are photographed from a distance, identifying their gender should
be faster than judging their emotional expressions; for photos that
zoom in on people’s facial features, the opposite may be true.
Likewise, it should be trivial to manipulate whether an ontological
judgment is faster or slower than an affective judgment by mak-
ing the judgments harder or easier relative to one another, e.g., by
manipulating how abstract the judgments are, or how common
they are.
The third proposal requires further consideration. Setting aside
the issue of whether affective and non-affective stimuli and judg-
ments can ever be meaningfully equated, does the relative speed
with which people activate affective vs. ontological information
depend on some general principle of how emotion is related to
cognition? Or alternatively, does it depend on the context in which
the stimuli are being evaluated?
To find out, here we asked participants to make affective and
non-affective judgments on stimuli they encountered in two dif-
ferent biasing contexts: an affective context and a non-affective
context. Across participants, the same judgments were made on
the same stimuli in both of the contexts: only the context var-
ied. To create the contexts, we used a modified “Task Set Inertia”
(TSI) paradigm (Allport and Wylie, 2000). Half of the stimuli
were words that named humans or animals which were positively
or negatively valenced, and the other half were pictures of complex
indoor or outdoor scenes which were either pleasant or unpleas-
ant. Words and pictures were randomly intermixed and the type of
judgments participants made on them (affective or non-affective)
varied orthogonally. As such, word judgments served as a biasing
context for picture judgments (Experiment 1), and picture judg-
ments served as a biasing context for word judgments (Experiment
2). Importantly, we made no attempt to equate the“biasing power”
of affective vs. non-affective orienting judgments, nor to equate
the “bais ability” of affective vs. non-affective target judgments,
or of picture vs. word stimulus items. Instead, we constructed a
fully within-judgment and within-item design, and predicted an
interaction of Context Type× Judgment Type for pictures (in the
context of words) and for words (in the context of pictures).
If context determines the relative speed with which affective and
non-affective information gets activated – holding both the stimuli
and the judgments constant – then affective judgments should be
faster in the context of other (irrelevant) affective judgments than
in the context of non-affective judgments. Likewise, non-affective
judgments should be faster in a non-affective context than in an
affective context. Alternatively, if one kind of information is nec-
essarily activated faster than the other, in accord with either the
Affective Primacy Hypothesis or the Cognitive Primacy Hypoth-
esis, then either affective or non-affective judgments should be
faster, across contexts.
EXPERIMENT 1: AFFECTIVE AND NON-AFFECTIVE
JUDGMENTS OF COMPLEX VISUAL SCENES
Experiment 1 tested the context-dependence of affective and non-
affective information cued by complex visual scenes (targets),
in the context of words (distractors). We predicted a context-
congruity effect: the relative speed with which affective and non-
affective information could be activated in response to the target
pictures should vary according to the type of processing (affective
or non-affective) participants were required to perform on the
context trials.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-four Native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (mean
age= 20.6) at the Radboud University Nijmegen participated with
payment. Of these participants, two had low accuracy (<75%)
and were excluded. Of the remaining 32, 16 were assigned to the
affective context group and 16 to the non-affective context group.
Participants gave informed consent before participation.
Materials
The stimuli consisted of 96 photos of complex scenes, 24 each
of 4 types: pleasant indoor, unpleasant indoor, pleasant outdoor,
unpleasant outdoor scenes. In a pretest, two independent raters
viewed the pictures, one picture at a time, and judged whether each
picture was positive or negative in valence. Inter-coder agreement
was 100%, confirming that half of the pictures were clearly positive
and the other half clearly negative. The 96 scenes were presented
over two blocks. For each participant, 12 of each of the 4 types of
nouns were randomly selected to be included in the first block, and
the remaining 12 of each type were presented in the second block.
The participants made affective judgments (Pleasant/Unpleasant)
on the scenes for one of these blocks, and non-affective judgments
(Indoor/Outdoor) for the other block. The order of the blocks was
counterbalanced between participants.
To create a biasing context, we adapted the TSI paradigm
(Allport and Wylie, 2000): randomly intermixed with the tar-
get scene trials were an equal number of distractor trials on
which participants made either affective or non-affective judg-
ments on words. The words consisted of 96 nouns, 24 each of
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4 types: positive-valence animals (e.g., konijntje “bunny,” panda
“panda,” etc.), negative-valence animals (e.g., parasite, “parasite,”
kakkerlak,“cockroach,”etc.), positive-valence humans (e.g., prinses
“princess,” grootvader “grandfather” etc.), and negative-valence
humans (moordenaar “murderer,” pedofiel “pedophile,” etc.)
A norming pretest was carried out to select positive- and
negative-valence words. Eighteen native Dutch speakers partici-
pated in the pretest for payment. Each participant was given 145
nouns, one word at a time, and was to rate the valence of each noun
on a 9-point Self-Assessment Manikins scale (Lang, 1980), ranged
from a smiling figure at the positive end of the scale to a frowning
one at the negative end (see Jasmin and Casasanto, 2012, for fur-
ther details). Based on the rating results, we chose 96 nouns that
were clearly positive or negative. The mean valence ratings were
6.78 (SD= 0.59) for the positive nouns and 2.79 (SD= 0.82) for
the negative nouns. The valence for the two types differed signifi-
cantly, as confirmed by a two-tailed t -test (t = 27.29, p= 0.0001).
Although our within-item design does not require the length, the
log frequency, or the arousal of words in different categories to be
matched, we still matched these factors.
Participants assigned to the affective context group made affec-
tive judgments (positive/negative) for all of the words. Partic-
ipants assigned to the non-affective context group made non-
affective (animal/human) judgments for all words. Thus, the
word-judgment trials created either an affective or a non-affective
“task set” as the context in which participants made both affective
and non-affective judgments on the target scenes.
Procedure
Participants sat in a comfortable chair about 90 cm from a monitor
in a soundproof, dimly lit experimental booth. Stimuli were pre-
sented on a computer monitor (resolution= 1024× 768 pixels).
In the target (scene) trials, the picture was presented for 300 ms,
followed by a dark screen until a judgment was made. In the
distractor (word) trials, the word was presented for 200 ms, also
followed by a dark screen until a judgment was made. Participants
were instructed to press the response keys (e.g., indoor, outdoor) as
quickly and accurately as possible. Participants responded with the
index fingers of both hands, and the left-right positions of keys cor-
responding to the affective and the non-affective responses were
counterbalanced across participants. A brief practice was given at
the beginning of the session, and a brief break was given between
the two blocks. Each session lasted approximately 15 min.
RESULTS
Inaccurate trials were excluded, resulting in the removal of 9.26%
of the data. We planned to remove RTs greater than 5000 ms, but
for all trials RTs were less than 5000 ms. The mean RTs from the
correct responses for the target trials are summarized in Figure 1.
To test the predicted effect of context on accuracy and RTs, we
carried out linear mixed-effects regression models of two context
types (affective, non-affective)× 2 judgment types (affective, non-
affective), using the lmer4 package in R. Following the guidelines
in Baayen (2008), we centered the means. We also employed the
principle of forward selection to construct two statistical mod-
els (Table 1): a simpler model that took into consideration the
random intercept of subject and items (RI model), and a more
FIGURE 1 | Reaction times for the (picture) targets when participants
made affective judgments (black bars) and non-affective judgments
(gray bars) in the affective context group (left bars) and the
non-affective context group (right bars). The error bars indicate
subject-wise SEM.
Table 1 |The linear mixed-effects regression models on the reaction
times for the (picture) targets.
Exp 1: pictures-as-target, RTs Coefficient SE t Random
slope
RI MODEL
Intercept 926.05 29.41 31.49*
Judgment type 41.74 5.55 7.52*
Context type −31.52 28.67 −1.10
Context type× judgment type −24.57 5.56 −4.42*
RIS MODEL
Intercept 927.17 29.45 31.49*
Judgment type 41.58 14.91 2.79* Sub, item
Context type −32.26 28.77 −1.12 Item
Context type× judgment type −24.45 14.63 −1.67 Sub, item
*A coefficient is a significant predictor of reaction time if |t|>2.
RI Model includes the random intercept of subject and items. RIS Model includes
both the random intercept of subject and items and the random slopes of subject
and/or item when the factor is a within-subject factor.
conservative model which took into consideration not only the
random intercept of subject and item but also the random slopes
of subject and/or item whenever it was appropriate (i.e., when
the factor is a within-subject factor (RIS model). To interpret the
significance, we adopted the criterion that a given coefficient is
significant if the absolute value of t exceeds 2 (Baayen, 2008).
Accuracy
The mean accuracy for all target trials was 90.8% (SE= 0.9%).
Within the affective context group, accuracy was 92.2%
(SE= 1.3%) for affective judgments and 92.0% (SE= 1.5%) for
non-affective judgments. Within the non-affective context group,
accuracy was 90.7% (SE= 1.5%) for affective judgments and
88.9% (SE= 1.8%) for non-affective judgments. There were no
interactions of main effects of context type or judgment type,
according to the RI and RIS models.
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Reaction times
For RTs, the context type interacted significantly with the judg-
ment type according to the RI model (Table 1, top). This inter-
action was anon-significant trend in the RIS model (Table 1,
bottom). There was a main effect of judgment type, indicat-
ing that affective judgments were made faster than non-affective
judgments. Planned comparisons within groups indicated that
affective responses were significantly faster than non-affective
responses in the affective context group (Figure 1, left bars),
by both the RI model (Coefficient= 66.01, SE= 7.78, t = 8.49)
and the RIS model (Coefficient= 65.82, SE= 21.78, t = 3.02). In
the non-affective context group (Figure 1, right bars), affective
responses were significantly faster than non-affective responses in
RI model (Coefficient= 18.12, SE= 8.03, t = 2.27), but this dif-
ference was not significant in the RIS model (Coefficient= 18.11,
SE= 20.06, t = 0.90). Between groups, no pairwise differences
were significant.
As predicted, the RT advantage for affective judgments rela-
tive to the non-affective judgments was significantly greater in the
affective context group (132 ms) than in the non-affective context
group (36 ms) according to the RI model. This interaction suggests
that context modulates the relative speed with which affective and
non-affective information is activated, even when the judgments
people make and the stimuli on which they make them are held
constant.1 The finding that this interaction was significant accord-
ing to the RI model, but not according to the more conservative
RIS model, suggests that this effect should be interpreted with
caution.
Importantly, the effect of context cannot be attributed to super-
ficial similarities between the responses participants made during
“context” and “target” trials. This is evident from an examination
of the pairwise comparisons that drove the predicted interaction.
If the effect of context had only been present for the affective judg-
ments, this would support a possible skeptical explanation of these
effects: perhaps making “positive/negative” judgments on words
during distractor trials facilitated making “pleasant/unpleasant”
judgments on target trials due to the semantic similarity of “posi-
tivity”and“pleasantness.”Yet, contrary to this skeptical possibility,
the effect of context was not driven primarily by the affective
condition (compare dark bars, Figure 1), but rather by the non-
affective condition (compare light bars, Figure 1). The effect
of context was found most strongly within ontological category
judgments, which were superficially dissimilar between the dis-
tractors and the targets (e.g., human-animal judgments facilitated
1Weaver et al. (2010) used a design similar to ours while examining a debated issue in
visual search, i.e., semantic influences from briefly presented peripheral cues. Despite
similarities between the studies, Weaver et al.’s goals were different from ours, and
their results do not license the same conclusions as ours. One reason is that Weaver et
al. did not hold the stimuli for creating the context constant: They used male/female
first names for creating the non-affective context, and positively/negatively words
for creating the affective context. By contrast with Weaver et al. (2010), the present
study held the context stimuli constant. Furthermore, Weaver et al. did not analyze
their data in a way that bears on the question of Affective vs. Cognitive primacy
(which was not their goal). Visual inspection of their Figure 1 (combining columns
across four separate plots) suggests that if they were to reanalyze the data, they
would observe a trend toward an effect of the affective/non-affective verbal process-
ing context on affective/non-affective processing of pictures that is compatible with
the present findings.
indoor-outdoor judgments). Since the effect of context cannot be
explained away by superficial similarities between distractor and
target judgments, we suggest that the biasing context influenced
RTs by orienting participants toward the relevant dimension of
the target stimulus (i.e., its affective content or ontological cate-
gory), consistent with the orienting effects found in previous TSI
experiments (Allport and Wylie, 2000; Brookshire et al., 2010).
The main effect of judgment type (affective vs. non-affective),
which was significant according to both the RI and RIS models,
bears most directly on the claim made by Nummenmaa et al.
(2010) regarding Affective vs. Cognitive Primacy. Nummenmaa
and colleagues concluded that non-affective judgments about the
ontological categories of stimuli necessarily precede affective judg-
ments – at least for judgments of complex visual scenes – consistent
with the Cognitive Primacy Hypothesis. Contrary to their findings,
we show here that affective judgments preceded ontological cate-
gory judgments of complex visual scenes. Since the present data
show the opposite pattern from Nummenmaa et al. (2010), clearly
it is not the case that one kind of judgments “must precede” the
other kind, as a general rule.
EXPERIMENT 2: AFFECTIVE AND NON-AFFECTIVE
JUDGMENTS OF WORDS
Experiment 2 tested whether the relationship between affective
and non-affective ontological processing is also context-dependent
for verbal stimuli, using a “mirror” version of Experiment 1. The
words were now used as the target trials, and the scenes as the
distractor trials, which provided an affective context for half of the
participants and a non-affective context for the other half. We pre-
dicted that the effect of congruity between the type of context and
the type of target judgments should be found for verbal stimuli.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-five Native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (mean
age= 21.4) at the Raboud University Nijmegen participated in
this experiment for payment. None of them previously took part
in Experiment 1. Of these participants, three had low accuracy
(<75%) and were excluded. Of the remaining 32, 16 were assigned
to the affective context group and 16 to the non-affective context
group. Participants gave informed consent before participation.
Materials
The materials and the procedure were the same as in Experi-
ment 1, with the following exceptions. The roles of the scenes
and words in the experimental design were reversed, so that the
words became the targets and the scenes the distractors. Target
judgments on the words were manipulated within subjects (i.e.,
they performed “positive/negative” judgments for one block of
trials and “animal/human” judgments for the other, with block
order counterbalanced across subjects). Distractor judgments on
the scenes were manipulated between subjects, providing each par-
ticipant with either an affective or a non-affective biasing context:
half of the participants performed “positive/negative” judgments
on the scenes, and the other half performed “indoor/outdoor”
judgments.
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RESULTS
Inaccurate trials were excluded, resulting in the removal of 9.56%
of the data. RTs> 5000 ms were also excluded, resulting in the
removal of 0.03% of the remaining data. The mean RTs from the
correct responses for the target trials are summarized in Figure 2.
To test the predicted effect of context on Accuracy and RTs,
we carried out linear mixed-effects regression models of two con-
text types (affective, non-affective)× 2 judgment types (affective,
non-affective), using the lmer4 package in R as in Experiment 1
(Tables 2 and 3).
Accuracy
The mean accuracy for all target trials was 90.4% (SE= 0.8%,
SD= 4.7%). There was a significant context type× judgment
type interaction in both the RI and RIS models, and a signifi-
cant main effect of the judgment type: non-affective judgments
were more accurate than affective judgments (Table 2). Within
the non-affective group (Figure 2, right bars), non-affective judg-
ments were more accurate than affective judgments (RI Coeffi-
cient= 0.04, SE= 0.01, t = 6.23; RIS Coefficient= 0.04, SE= 0.01,
FIGURE 2 | Accuracies for the (word) targets when participants made
affective judgments (dark bars) and non-affective judgments (light
bars) in the affective context group (left bars) and the non-affective
context group (right bars). The error bars indicate subject-wise SEM.
Table 2 |The linear mixed-effects regression models on the accuracies
for the (word) targets.
Exp 2: words-as-target,
accuracy
Coefficient SE t Random
slope
RI MODEL
Intercept 0.90 0.02 45.20*
Judgment type 0.03 0.004 5.95*
Context type −0.01 0.01 −1.19
Context type× judgment type 0.012 0.004 2.96*
RIS MODEL
Intercept 0.90 0.02 45.25*
Judgment type 0.03 0.01 3.50* Sub, item
Context type −0.01 0.01 −1.19 Item
Context type× judgment type 0.012 0.01 2.02* sub, item
*A coefficient is a significant predictor of reaction time if |t|> 2.
t = 3.86). Within the affective group (Figure 2, left bars), non-
affective judgments were more accurate than affective judgments
according to RI (Coefficient= 0.01, SE= 0.01, t = 2.33), but not
RIS (Coefficient= 0.01, SE= 0.01, t = 1.69). Comparing judg-
ments between context groups, affective judgments (Figure 2,
black bars) were more accurate in affective context than in non-
affective context (Coefficient=−0.04, SE= 0.02, |t |= 2.22). No
other significant pairwise differences were significant.
Reaction times
Significant context type× judgment type interactions were found
in both the RI and RIS models (Table 3), suggesting that context
modulates the speed of affective and non-affective responses for
words. Within the affective context group (Figure 3, left bars),
affective judgments were faster than non-affective judgments in
the RI model (Coefficient= 22.58, SE= 7.44, t = 3.04), but this
difference was not significant in the more conservative RIS model
(Coefficient= 22.61, SE= 19.33, t = 1.17). Conversely, within the
non-affective context group (Figure 3, right bars), non-affective
Table 3 |The linear mixed-effects regression models on the reaction
times for the (word) targets.
Exp 2: words-as-target, RTs Coefficient SE t Random
slope
RI MODEL
Intercept 863.07 25.13 34.35*
Judgment type −6.71 5.42 −1.24
Context type 17.58 24.31 0.72
Context type× judgment type −30.10 5.38 −5.59*
RIS MODEL
Intercept 863.50 25.20 34.20*
Judgment type −6.00 12.58 −0.48 sub, item
Context type 18.34 24.46 0.75 item
Context type× judgment type −29.31 12.33 −2.38* sub, item
*A coefficient is a significant predictor of reaction time if |t|>2.
FIGURE 3 | RTs for the (word) targets when participants made affective
judgments (black bars) and non-affective judgments (gray bars) in the
affective context group (left bars) and the non-affective context group
(right bars). The error bars indicate subject-wise SEM.
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judgments were significantly faster than the affective judgments, in
both models (RI Coefficient=−36.80, SE= 7.92, |t |= 4.65; RIS
Coefficient=−35.84, SE= 15.87, |t |= 2.26). No other pairwise
differences were significant.
Thus, as predicted, the representations cued by words were
modulated by context, as reflected by the interaction between the
context type and the judgment type in the RTs. In addition, the
analysis of accuracy showed that people were more accurate in
making non-affective judgments than affective judgments, and
that non-affective accuracy advantage was significantly greater in
the non-affective context group (7.9%) than in the non-affective
context group (2.8%). Thus, the processing context modulated
both the speed and the accuracy of participants’ judgments.
Combining Experiments 1 and 2
A further analysis tested whether the effects of context differed
according to the format of the stimuli being judged, pictorial
(Experiment 1) or verbal (Experiment 2). The combined Accuracy
data is plotted in Figure 4, and the combined RTs in Figure 5. We
conducted a linear mixed-effects regression on the results of Exper-
iments 1 and 2 (2 experiments× 2 context types× 2 judgment
types).
Accuracy
There was a three-way interaction of context type, judgment type,
and experiment, as well as a two-way interaction of context type
and judgment type (Table 4). There was no experiment by context
type interaction, or main effect of experiment. Pairwise com-
parisons showed that within non-affective context, non-affective
judgments were more accurate than affective judgments (RI
Coefficient= 0.02, SE= 0.005, t = 3.28; RIS Coefficient= 0.02,
SE= 0.01, t = 2.12). Holding judgment type constant, affective
judgments were more accurate in affective context than in non-
affective context (RI Coefficient=−0.02, SE= 0.006, |t |= 2.46).
There were trends in the predicted directions for the remain-
ing pairwise comparisons, but the observed differences were not
significant.
FIGURE 4 | Accuracies for the combined (picture and word) targets
when participants made affective judgments (dark bars) and
non-affective judgments (light bars) in the affective context group (left
bars) and the non-affective context group (right bars). The error bars
indicate subject-wise SEM.
Reaction times
There was no three-way interaction in either RI or RIS models
(Table 5). Therefore, there was no significant difference between
pictures and words in terms of the strength of the effect of con-
text on target judgments. There was no experiment by context
type interaction, and no main effect of experiment. The signif-
icant context type× judgment type interaction found in each
experiment was replicated in the data from both experiments,
combined. Planned comparisons showed that within the affec-
tive context, affective judgments were faster than non-affective
judgments (RI Coefficient=−44.18, SE= 14.84, |t |= 2.98; RIS
FIGURE 5 | Reaction times for the combined (picture and word) targets
from Experiments 1 and 2 when participants made affective
judgments (dark bars) and non-affective judgments (light bars) in the
affective context group (left bars) and the non-affective context group
(right bars). The error bars indicate subject-wise SEM.
Table 4 |The linear mixed-effects regression models on the accuracies
for the (picture and word) targets.
Exp 1+exp 2, accuracy Coefficient SE t Random
slope
RI MODEL
Intercept 0.90 0.02 45.63*
Exp: pictorial or verbal 0.003 0.03 0.12
Judge: judgment type 0.03 0.004 5.97*
Context: context type −0.01 0.01 −1.07
Exp× judge −0.03 0.01 −5.42*
Exp× context −0.004 0.01 −0.41
Judge× context 0.01 0.004 2.97*
Exp× judge× context −0.02 0.01 −2.58*
RIS MODEL
Intercept 0.90 0.02 45.66*
Exp: pictorial or verbal 0.004 0.03 0.15
Judge: judgment type 0.03 0.01 3.73* Sub, item
Context: context type −0.01 0.01 −1.21 Item
Exp× judge −0.03 0.01 −3.34* Item
Exp× context −0.003 0.01 −0.35 Item
Judge× context 0.01 0.01 2.26* Sub, item
Exp× judge× context −0.02 0.01 −1.99 Sub, item
*A coefficient is a significant predictor of reaction time if |t|>2.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science July 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 243 | 6
Lai et al. Context-dependent affective primacy vs. cognitive primacy
Table 5 |The linear mixed-effects regression models on the reaction
times for the (picture and word) targets.
Exp 1+Exp 2, RTs Coefficient SE t Random
slope
RI MODEL
Intercept 863.07 27.35 31.55*
Exp: pictorial or verbal 63.00 38.68 1.63
Judge: judgment type −6.73 5.50 −1.22
Context: context type 17.58 26.58 0.66
Exp× judge 48.48 7.76 6.25*
Exp× context −49.09 37.59 −1.31
Judge× context −30.10 5.46 −5.51*
Exp× judge× context −5.53 7.74 0.72
RIS MODEL
Intercept 863.30 27.39 31.53*
Exp: pictorial or verbal 63.85 38.72 1.65
Judge: judgment type −6.64 13.78 −0.48 Sub, item
Context: context type 17.99 26.66 0.68 Item
Exp× judge 48.59 19.48 2.49* Item
Exp× context −50.32 37.70 −1.34 Item
Judge× context −29.74 13.48 −2.21* Sub, item
Exp× judge× context 5.37 19.07 0.28 Sub, item
*A coefficient is a significant predictor of reaction time if |t|> 2.
Coefficient=−44.34, SE= 5.40, |t |= 8.22). There were trends in
the predicted directions for all other pairwise comparisons, but
the observed differences were not significant.
DISCUSSION
In two experiments we show that the context in which stimuli
are processed can determine the relative speed with which peo-
ple make affective and non-affective judgments on pictures and
words. The effect of processing context was found even though
the stimuli themselves and the judgments participants made were
held constant. Context had a moderate effect on the relative speed
with which affective and non-affective information was activated
in response to complex visual scenes, which was significant accord-
ing to the simpler of the two statistical models we constructed,
but not according to the more conservative model. For judg-
ments on words, the effect of context caused a complete reversal
of the relationship between affective and non-affective ontologi-
cal judgments: affective judgments were faster than non-affective
judgments in an affective context, whereas non-affective judg-
ments were faster than affective judgments in a non-affective con-
text. Overall, these findings challenge both the Affective Primacy
and the Cognitive Primacy hypotheses, belying any broad gen-
eralization about processing priority for affective or ontological
information.
The main effect of judgment type that we report for judg-
ments of complex visual scenes (Experiment 1) disconfirms the
conclusions of the most direct test of Affective Primacy vs. Cogni-
tive Primacy to date. Whereas non-affective judgments were faster
than affective judgments of complex visual scenes in the study by
Nummenmaa et al. (2010), the opposite pattern was found for
scene judgments here. Even within the test bed of complex visual
scenes, there is no consistent answer to the question of whether
affective or ontological information gets activated faster.
The question of Affective Primacy vs. Cognitive Primacy, which
has been debated for three decades, is ill-posed: there is no unique
answer. The time course over which affective and ontological infor-
mation gets activated may still be fruitfully investigated, so long
as the goal of the investigation is not to determine which kind of
information gets activated first as a rule. A more productive goal
may be to determine the factors that cause affective information
to have processing priority in some circumstances and ontological
information in others. Our suggestion is compatible with a grow-
ing movement in the affective and cognitive sciences to consider
people’s thoughts and emotions not as fixed representations to be
“accessed” from a static memory bank, but rather as representa-
tions that are constructed dynamically, activating information in
long-term memory ad hoc, on the basis of both the proximal cues
(e.g., words, pictures) and the physical and social contexts in which
they occur (Barsalou, 1985; Eastwood and Smilek, 2005; Barrett,
2006; Frischen et al., 2008; Casasanto, 2011; Wilson-Mendenhall
et al., 2011).
In Experiment 1, context affected RTs but had no significant
effect on the accuracy of affective or non-affective judgments of
pictures. In Experiment 2, context affected both RTs and accuracy:
overall, word judgments that were faster were also more accurate,
on average.2 Together, these results indicate that the RT effects we
observed were not due to a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Details of both the RTs and the accuracy results suggest that
representations activated by target words (in the context of bias-
ing picture judgments) may have been more malleable than the
representations activated by target pictures (in the context of bias-
ing word judgments). We obtained RT context effects of similar
sizes for scene judgments and for word judgments (i.e., we found
2-way interactions of context type and judgment type, the mag-
nitude of which did not differ statistically between experiments),
the details of the scene- and word-judgment data were different
descriptively. For the scene targets (Experiment 1), affective judg-
ments were made faster than the non-affective judgments, in both
contexts (i.e., there was a main effect of judgment type as well as the
predicted interaction). For the word targets, however, we observed
a full crossover interaction. Likewise, context affected accuracy sig-
nificantly for word judgments but not picture judgments. On one
possible explanation for these differences between experiments,
the mental representations participants activated in response to
target scenes (which were detailed color photographs) may have
been more constrained by the stimuli themselves than was the case
for the representations they activated in response to target words.
Whereas words name generic types (e.g., “puppy” can refer to any
2One reviewer pointed out that there appears to be a speed-accuracy tradeoff within
affective judgments in Experiment 2. This trend, however, is not statistically reli-
able according to the more conservative RIS model. It would be inappropriate to
interpret this unpredicted, marginal effect, especially in light of the facts that there
was no trace of speed-accuracy tradeoff in Experiment 1. Furthermore, there was
no speed-accuracy tradeoff in Experiment 2, considering all of the data, combined
(and we had no prediction that would license breaking it down). Finally, the oppo-
site pattern is found in the non-affective condition of Experiment 2 (i.e., trials that
were more accurate were also faster), and there is no speed-accuracy tradeoff in the
data from Experiments 1 and 2, combined.
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puppy), pictures depict a specific instance of a type (e.g., a photo
must be of a specific puppy). Therefore, representations activated
in response to our target photographs may be more constrained
than representations activated in response to the target words (cf.,
Hermans et al., 1994). In addition to the possibility that words
tend to cue more variable representations than photographs, it
is possible that photographs provided a stronger biasing context
than words did, again due to their greater specificity.
CONCLUSION
Holding both the stimuli and the judgments constant, the con-
text in which people make affective and non-affective ontologi-
cal judgments can determine the relative speed of affective and
non-affective processing, for both pictures and words. Neither
the Affective Primacy Hypothesis nor the Cognitive Primacy
hypothesis is uniquely supported when processing context is
taken into account. Thus the question of whether affective or
non-affective ontological information has processing priority is
ill-posed. These findings are consistent with a view of the mind
according to which words and pictures activate different neu-
rocognitive representations every time they are processed (see also
Schyns, 1998; Elman, 2004; Casasanto and Lupyan, under review),
the specifics of which are co-determined by the stimuli themselves
and the contexts in which they occur.
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